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Information Processing Costs and Corporate Tax Avoidance: 





The IRS uses information contained in financial statements as well as tax returns to detect tax 
avoidance behavior. We examine the impact on corporate tax avoidance behavior of reductions in 
the IRS’s information processing costs resulting from the mandatory adoption of XBRL for 
financial reporting. Motivated by the recent debate in the U.S. Congress over the cost-benefit of 
mandatory XBRL reporting for small firms, we pay particular attention to small firms, which 
inherently have relatively high information frictions. We find that adoption of XBRL for financial 
reporting results in a significant decrease in tax avoidance. However, the negative relationship 
between XBRL reporting and tax avoidance is less prominent for firms subject to more intense 
IRS monitoring in the pre-XBRL-reporting period. Overall, our results suggest that XBRL 
reporting reduces the cost of IRS monitoring in terms of information processing, which dampens 
managerial incentives to engage in tax avoidance behavior. 
 
 
Keywords: XBRL reporting; tax avoidance; information processing costs; IRS monitoring; tax 
audit risk; tax accrual




The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has mandated all small-cap firms to 
file their 10-K and 10-Q reports in an interactive format using the eXtensible Business Reporting 
Language (XBRL) starting on June 15, 2011.1 XBRL reporting lowers information processing 
costs by making financial statements machine readable and assists external users of financial 
statements in accessing, extracting, comparing, and screening financial information in a more 
accurate and efficient manner (Dong et al., 2016; Kim, Li, and Liu, 2019).2  The mandatory 
adoption of XBRL reporting offers a unique opportunity to study the role of (unobservable) 
information processing costs in external monitoring, while holding the content of financial 
reporting constant.  
Our main research question is whether the XBRL-induced reduction in information 
processing costs to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) affects managerial decisions to engage in 
tax avoidance activities. Managers strive to invest in strategies that lower corporate taxes in order 
to increase value for shareholders (Mills, 1996; Mills et al., 1998; Rego and Wilson, 2012). 
However, non-tax costs, including information costs, agency costs, pricing discounts, reputational 
costs, and penalties if detected that are related to excessive tax avoidance strategies are substantial 
(Graham et al., 2014; Hasan et al., 2014). Several studies find that such costs may outweigh the 
benefits of tax savings for firms with high informational opacity (Chen et al., 2010; McGuire et 
al., 2013). As direct evidence of reputational costs, Graham et al. (2014) report that 69 percent of 
 
1 XBRL is an interactive data electronic application system in which a standardized format is used for preparing and 
communicating financial information. In the system financial data are tagged based on standard definitions. These 
standardized tags contain descriptive labels, definitions, and authoritative references to U.S. GAAP and SEC 
regulations. The SEC’s ultimate objective is to use XBRL for all EDGAR filings 
(https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-9002.pdf). 
2 For example, the SEC (2009, p. 128) states: “Requiring companies to report interactive data should lower both the 
time and expense for investors to access this data. Since company financial data will be tagged and immediately 
downloadable into a larger, more comprehensive database that includes other filers, there will be no need for manual 
key entry of the data, eliminating this expense.” 
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surveyed corporate tax executives rate reputation as important in explaining why firms would not 
engage in a potential tax planning strategy. We conjecture that mandatory XBRL adoption reduces 
the information processing costs relating to financial statements, enhances the probability of the 
IRS detecting tax avoidance behavior, and thus, increases the cost of tax avoidance activities to 
firms. 
The use of XBRL tags applies to a range of tax-related information contained in financial 
statements, including tax accruals, complex and technical tax notes, the reconciliation of the 
effective income tax rate to the federal statutory income tax rate, the deferred tax asset (DTA) or 
liability, the valuation allowance of the DTA, as well as income tax benefits from share-based 
compensation. XBRL reporting facilitates the IRS’s access to such tax-related information and 
improves efficient comparison of a firm’s tax liabilities against relevant benchmarks. Financial 
statements in XBRL format will reveal any abnormally high deviations in a firm’s reported 
performance (e.g., book income or taxable income) from benchmark figures (e.g., the industry 
average or historical trends) to the IRS in a more accurate, timelier, and less costly manner than 
before the adoption of XBRL reporting.3 As a result, XBRL reporting makes it easier for the IRS 
to detect excessive tax avoidance and penalize tax evaders. The increased costs associated with a 
higher detection risk reduce the incentive for managers to engage in tax avoidance activities. 
Consistent with this view, the IRS Research Bulletin (2008, p. 33) points out that “…the eventual 
adoption of XBRL in SEC financial reporting will further allow efficient comparisons between 
financial and tax return information. The triangulation of data can greatly enhance the ability of 
 
3 Specifically, Terry Lutes (Associate CIO at the IRS) and Eric Cohen (XBRL Technical Leader at PWC) suggest that 
XBRL enables automation of the reconciliation of book and tax difference and facilitates the tracking of permanent 
and timing differences between book and tax profit by means of its special tax functionalities (e.g., the XBRL Global 
Ledger framework incorporates FAS 109 and IAS 12): 
 http://www.xbrl.org/glkeyfeatures/gl_webseminar_lutescohen_051215.pdf 
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agents to properly and holistically analyze the economic enterprise, part of which is included on 
the U.S. tax return.” 
In our study, we focus on a sample of small-cap firms with a public float of less than $700 
million and adopt a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design. Our identification strategy 
requires us to construct a control group over the sample period covering both the pre-XBRL-
adoption and post-XBRL-adoption periods. We track sample firms’ tax avoidance behavior over 
the five-year period 2009–2013, which includes the pre-adoption years of 2009–2010, the adoption 
year of 2011, and the post-adoption years of 2012–2013. 
We focus on small-cap firms for the following reasons.4 First, small-cap firms have more 
severe information opacity and users of their financial statements face higher information 
processing costs compared to large-cap firms and medium-cap firms. Small-cap firms also have 
strong incentives for tax avoidance (Zimmerman, 1983; Omer et al., 1993).5 Thus, if information 
processing costs play a role in determining the effectiveness of IRS monitoring, we are likely to 
detect a stronger effect of the XBRL-induced reduction in information processing costs on tax 
avoidance for small-cap firms than for large-cap or medium-cap firms. 
Second, based on large-cap firms that were part of the first phase of the introduction of 
XBRL reporting, Blankespoor et al. (2014) find evidence of higher abnormal bid-ask spreads 
around the dates of 10-K filings in the year after the mandate than prior years. Their results suggest 
that the intended benefit from XBRL reporting in terms of levelling the informational playing field 
 
4 In untabulated analyses, we investigated whether mandatory XBRL adoption influences corporate tax policies for 
large-cap and mid-cap firms. We find that the relationship between XBRL adoption and corporate tax avoidance is 
not statistically significant for these firms, supporting the view that large firms have rich information environments 
and thus the benefit of XBRL reporting to the IRS could be marginal relative to small-cap firms. These results are 
available upon request. For details on the SEC’s three phased-in implementations of XBRL, refer to Kim et al. (2019). 
5 Zimmerman (1983) argues that small firms are less subject to government scrutiny and wealth transfers than large 
firms, and thus engage in more tax avoidance activities. However, Rego (2003) finds that large, multinational firms 
have lower worldwide ETRs than other firms, suggesting that the economies of scale can also influence firms’ ability 
to reduce tax burden through strategic tax planning.  
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is not immediately observable after mandatory adoption for Phase 1 firms. Anecdotal evidence 
also suggests that in the initial years after mandatory adoption, firms make various mistakes in 
XBRL reporting and it takes time for both managers and external users to become familiar with 
and take advantage of XBRL reporting. Our focus on small-cap (Phase 3) firms allows sufficient 
time for these firms to learn from the earlier adoption of XBRL by their Phase 1 and Phase 2 
counterparts in the same industry and offer necessary training to their accounting personnel. 
Finally, there has been controversy from a policy perspective about whether small-cap 
firms should adopt XBRL for financial reporting. In 2014, the House Financial Service Committee 
overwhelmingly supported the bipartisan Small Company Disclosure Simplification Act that would 
exempt small public firms with less than $250 million in annual revenue (roughly 60% of U.S. 
public firms) from the XBRL requirement for five years. The bill died in that session of Congress 
but was reintroduced in 2015. The House of Representatives passed the bill in February 2016 but 
the White House responded immediately by issuing a veto threat.6 Proponents of this bill believe 
that this is an example of a regulation where the costs of compliance outweigh the potential benefits 
for small, innovative firms. Opponents of the bill argue that small public firms have been filing in 
XBRL format for several years (since 2011), and so are in an advanced position on the learning 
curve, and that the bill could result in small firms losing equal access to the capital markets. 
Although we do not intend to resolve the policy debate by directly testing the cost-benefit trade-
off for small-cap firms, our results shed light on a real consequence of XBRL reporting as reflected 
in their tax planning strategies. 
We adopt three common measures of tax avoidance and a composite measure (BTD_Factor) 
that combines the three: (i) total book-tax differences (BTD); (ii) Desai-Dharmapala residual book-
 
6 See https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/114/saphr1675r_20160202.pdf 
for details. 
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tax differences (DD_BTD); and (iii) effective tax rate differentials (ETR_Differential) (Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2006; Frank et al., 2009). The results of our regression analyses with and without a 
control group are consistent with our prediction that XBRL reporting leads to a decrease in tax 
avoidance. The decrease is economically significant as we observe declines in BTD, DD_BTD, 
and ETR_Differential of 17.03%, 17.03%, and 20.78%, respectively, relative to their averages in 
the pre-XBRL period. Furthermore, we find that these results are weaker for firms that are subject 
to more intensive IRS monitoring before the XBRL mandate. Such firms are likely to have less 
incentive to engage in tax avoidance activities before the XBRL mandate; thus, the impact of 
XBRL reporting on their tax avoidance is limited. The cross-sectional results reinforce the notion 
that IRS monitoring is a viable mechanism through which XBRL reporting influences firms’ tax 
avoidance behavior. 
An implicit assumption in our study is that financial statements are an important source of 
information that the IRS uses to detect tax avoidance behavior. To check the validity of this 
assumption, we explore whether the adoption of XBRL for financial reporting affects how the IRS 
processes firms’ 10-K information. Using Bozanic et al.’s (2017) data, we find a statistically and 
economically significant increase in IRS downloads of sample firms’ 10-Ks from EDGAR in the 
post-XBRL period. This result suggests that XBRL reporting is likely to facilitate a broader and 
more structured approach to identifying firms that engage in tax avoidance activities by the IRS, 
leading to greater reliance on financial statement information for this purpose. 
Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we provide evidence suggesting 
that the IRS’s information processing costs influence firms’ tax avoidance activities. Compelling 
evidence on this link is scarce for the following three reasons. First, information processing costs 
are unobservable and difficult to measure. Second, because the level of information processing 
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costs and the extent of tax avoidance are both subject to managerial actions, their relationship 
could suffer from potential endogeneity. The observed association between the two may be 
spurious and influenced by unobservable firm characteristics such as growth opportunities, agency 
problems, and other risk-related factors. Finally, managers can intentionally increase the IRS’s 
information processing costs by increasing financial obfuscation or reporting opacity in an effort 
to lower detection risk and/or to reduce the penalties associated with tax avoidance when detected. 
As such, the relationship between information processing costs and tax avoidance is subject to 
reverse causality. In our study, we attempt to mitigate these concerns by taking advantage of the 
SEC’s XBRL mandate to study the impact of a shock to the IRS’s information processing costs on 
corporate tax avoidance. 
Second, our study extends the literature on the economic consequences of XBRL reporting. 
Whereas prior studies primarily focus on the stock market consequences of XBRL reporting, we 
examine its relationship with corporate tax behavior. If XBRL reporting reduces information 
processing costs and facilitates IRS monitoring, the cost of tax avoidance will increase due to 
higher detection risk, which in turn curbs managerial incentives to engage in such behavior. Our 
results point to an economic consequence of XBRL reporting in terms of real corporate decisions 
that has not yet drawn sufficient attention from the lawmakers who actively debated its cost-benefit 
trade-off for small firms. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Recent research on the economic consequences of mandatory XBRL adoption 
Following the SEC’s XBRL mandate, a growing body of research has investigated the 
economic consequences of financial reporting in XBRL format. Li et al. (2012) find that XBRL 
reporting leads to a decrease in the cost of equity capital, an increase in analyst coverage, a 
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decrease in analyst forecast error and dispersion, and an increase in market liquidity. A follow-up 
study by Liu et al. (2014) finds that the association between XBRL reporting and analyst forecast 
quality is stronger in the second year after introduction than in the first year for large-cap firms. 
This result implies that it takes time for the benefit of XBRL reporting to materialize because there 
is a steep learning curve for both preparers and users of financial statements to become familiar 
with this new information dissemination technology. 
Dong et al. (2016) find that XBRL reporting facilitates the incorporation of firm-specific 
information into stock prices and lowers stock price co-movement. Kim, Li, and Liu (2019) 
document evidence that the investor base or breadth of share ownership increases in the post-
XBRL-adoption period, and that these effects are stronger for firms with higher information 
processing costs. In contrast to these studies, Blankespoor et al. (2014) examine the market 
reaction to Phase 1 adopters in the initial year of XBRL reporting and, surprisingly, they find 
higher abnormal bid–ask spreads, lower abnormal liquidity, and lower abnormal trading volumes.  
Whereas early studies primarily focus on stock market reactions to XBRL reporting, recent 
research has paid more attention to the implications for corporate behavior. For example, Kim, 
Kim, and Lim (2019) show that the XBRL mandate leads to a significant reduction in earnings 
management, suggesting that the reduction in information processing costs constrains managerial 
opportunism in financial reporting. Zhang et al. (2019) find that XBRL reporting reduces 
information opacity and bad news hoarding, thereby reducing the expected stock price crash risk 
perceived by options market participants. Finally, Blankespoor (2019) provides evidence that firms 
increase the use of quantitative footnote disclosures upon implementation of XBRL reporting. Our 
study extends this line of research by examining whether the XBRL-induced reduction in 
information processing costs is significant enough to influence corporate tax avoidance behavior. 
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2.2. Recent research on determinants of corporate tax avoidance 
As reflected in an increasing trend in the size of book-tax differences (BTDs), corporate 
tax avoidance has become an important aspect of U.S. corporate policies in the last several decades 
(Desai, 2003; Graham, 2003; Boynton et al., 2005). A large body of tax research has investigated 
determinants of tax avoidance. For example, Gupta and Newberry (1997) find that a firm’s capital 
structure, asset mix, and financial performance play meaningful roles in explaining effective tax 
rates. Rego (2003) documents evidence that multinational firms with more extensive foreign 
operations have greater incentives and resources to engage in tax avoidance activities. Lisowsky 
(2010) shows that BTD and contingent tax liabilities are associated with the usage of tax shelters, 
and in turn are shaped by firm characteristics such as foreign-source income, litigation losses, 
profitability, size, and leverage.7 
Several studies focus on the role of IRS monitoring in corporate tax avoidance. Mills 
(1998) documents that larger BTD creates red flags for the IRS and weakens the firm’s position in 
a tax audit. Hoopes et al. (2012) show that when tax enforcement is stricter, firms adopt less 
aggressive tax positions, suggesting that IRS audits are effective in deterring tax avoidance. 
Kubick et al. (2017) find that whereas the IRS is more likely to audit firms based nearby, on 
average those firms avoid more tax (possibly due to their proximity-induced information 
advantage over the IRS) unless they are close to an IRS industry specialist. Bozanic et al. (2017) 
provide direct evidence that, in addition to private tax filings, the IRS uses information in public 
financial disclosures in the enforcement process. Their results, based on FIN 48 disclosures 
pertaining to uncertain tax positions, indicate that changes in SEC disclosure requirements have a 
meaningful impact on the IRS’s behavior with regard to public information acquisition. Extending 
 
7 Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and Wilde and Wilson (2018) provide excellent reviews of the research on corporate 
tax avoidance. 
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this line of research, we examine whether the reduction in information processing costs for public 
financial disclosures, attributable to the SEC’s XBRL mandate, affects IRS monitoring and 
corporate tax avoidance. 
2.3. Hypothesis development 
2.3.1. The impact of XBRL reporting on corporate tax avoidance  
 Public financial disclosures provide additional data for the IRS to use in the enforcement 
process and to supplement private information it obtains from firms’ tax filings. However, the IRS 
enforcement process is subject to cost constraints. To the extent that the IRS seeks public 
information from firms’ financial reports to corroborate its private information (Bozanic et al., 
2017), information processing costs are likely to be a factor that influences the IRS’s use of such 
information. 
 Several experimental studies find that the use of search-facilitating technology such as 
XBRL can improve the ability of financial statement users to process related financial information 
(Hirst and Hopkins, 1998; Hodge et al., 2004). Their results suggest that, by facilitating 
consistency in the format of data across firms, XBRL reporting not only makes financial data more 
comparable and timelier but also enables abnormally high deviations from benchmarks (e.g., the 
industry average or historical trends) in a firm’s reported performance to be revealed to the public 
more efficiently. Consequently, we conjecture that IRS examiners are better able to monitor tax-
related activities and identify audit issues in the post-XBRL information environment.  
 The XBRL mandate is not intended to provide new information beyond what has been 
reported in traditional financial statements. Rather, it is intended to create a more user-friendly, 
less costly search-facilitating information environment (SEC, 2009). With XBRL reporting, most 
items of a quantitative nature disclosed in financial statements are tagged in accordance with 
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standard taxonomies common to all firms. This not only facilitates the IRS’s access to public tax 
information (contained in financial disclosures) in a more efficient and effective manner, but also 
enhances its ability to compare and track firms’ tax strategies against relevant benchmarks. The 
IRS provides its staff with specific guidance to identify potential tax issues for firms with abnormal 
book-tax differences (Cloyd et al., 1996). Using proprietary tax return data, Mills and Sansing 
(2000) confirm that firms with larger book-tax differences are subject to higher audit risk. XBRL 
reporting facilitates comparison of firms’ taxable income and book income and this phenomenon 
is likely to be stronger for small firms with greater informational frictions.  
 If tax avoidance is deemed by the IRS to be noncompliance, it may be disallowed, and the 
firm may face scrutiny that is more stringent in the future. Furthermore, IRS challenges may 
impose significant back taxes and substantial related fines, penalties, and interest, representing a 
significant cash flow risk for the firm. The mandatory adoption of XBRL for financial reporting 
reduces the IRS’s information processing costs and enhances its tax monitoring. As such, facing a 
higher potential tax audit risk, managers may curb their tax avoidance behavior after the XBRL 
mandate. Based on the above discussion, we expect a negative relationship between XBRL 
reporting and tax avoidance. To provide systematic evidence on this unexplored issue, we test the 
following hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
H1: Corporate tax avoidance decreases after the adoption of XBRL for financial reporting, 
all else being equal. 
 
The above hypothesis builds on the assumption that financial statements offer an important 
source of information that IRS examiners use to detect tax avoidance behavior. However, it is 
possible that under certain circumstances the IRS will place more weight on private tax disclosures 
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than on public financial statements to assess tax compliance.8 If financial statements, as a major 
source of public information about firm performance, do not play a significant role in the IRS’s 
tax monitoring activities, the reporting format of financial statements (i.e., the introduction of 
XBRL) should also be irrelevant. 
2.3.2. The impact of XBRL reporting on tax avoidance conditional on pre-XBRL tax audit risk 
 
 In developing H1, we argue that the XBRL mandate reduces the cost to the IRS of acquiring 
and processing public tax-related information contained in financial reports, resulting in more 
effective monitoring. If H1 is descriptive and IRS monitoring is indeed a channel through which 
information processing costs affect firms’ tax avoidance behavior, we expect that the effect of 
XBRL adoption on tax avoidance should vary with the intensity of IRS oversight before the 
mandate. To the extent that firms already attract intense IRS scrutiny before XBRL reporting, 
information asymmetry between firms and the IRS is low and firms may have taken account of 
IRS monitoring in selecting their tax avoidance level. Where intense IRS scrutiny is already in 
place, firms will be familiar with the agency’s enforcement practices and their tax avoidance 
strategies are likely to reflect their understanding of high tax audit risk. Thus, the marginal effect 
 
8 For example, the IRS introduced Schedule UTP (to Form 1120) in 2010, which required firms to privately disclose 
to the IRS the uncertain tax positions that underlie their contingent tax liability. Bozanic et al. (2017) find that the 
IRS’s acquisition of public financial statements decreased following Schedule UTP. They also show that subsequent 
to Schedule UTP, firms significantly increased the quantity and altered the content of their public tax-related 
disclosures. Because the introduction of Schedule UTP and the adoption of XBRL for financial reporting occurred at 
around the same time, it is possible that our results are driven by the change in IRS private disclosure requirements. 
As a sensitivity test, we attempt to isolate this effect by controlling for whether the firm filed Schedule UTP to the 
IRS in our regression analyses. The IRS has gradually reduced the asset threshold for the requirement to report 
uncertain tax positions on Schedule UTP: $100 million for tax years 2010 and 2011; $50 million for tax years 2012 
and 2013; and $10 million after 2014. We include in our regression models a dummy variable that equals one if the 
firm satisfies the asset threshold for filing Schedule UTP and zero otherwise. Our results concerning the relationship 
between XBRL adoption and tax avoidance remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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of XBRL adoption for financial reporting on tax avoidance should be less prominent for firms 
subject to closer IRS monitoring before the adoption. 
 We use the level of risk of IRS audit that firms face before the XBRL mandate to capture 
the intensity of IRS scrutiny. Hoopes et al. (2012) find that firms subject to higher tax audit risk 
engage in less tax avoidance. They measure the risk of tax audit as the proportion of corporate tax 
return audits completed in the IRS’s fiscal year t for an IRS asset size group to all corporate tax 
returns received in the previous year for the same IRS asset size group. Hoopes et al.’s (2012) 
results suggest that from the perspective of managers, stricter tax monitoring accompanied by a 
higher likelihood of IRS tax audits reduces managers’ incentives to engage in tax avoidance 
behavior. From the IRS’s perspective, intense tax monitoring reduces the information gap between 
the firm and the agency. Thus, if intense IRS monitoring is already in place, the adoption of XBRL 
for financial reporting is expected to be less likely to change corporate tax avoidance behavior. 
The above discussion leads to our second hypothesis, stated below in alternative form: 
H2: The relationship between corporate tax avoidance and the adoption of XBRL for 
financial reporting is less pronounced for firms that were subject to higher tax audit 
risk before the XBRL mandate, all else being equal. 
  
 
3. Data and research design 
 
3.1. Sample and data sources 
 
 To construct our sample, we extract all XBRL filings submitted to the SEC from the 
EDGAR database of Interactive Data Filings and Really Simple Syndication feed files. We obtain 
financial statement data from COMPUSTAT. As mentioned in Section 1, the SEC introduced 
XBRL for financial reporting in three phases. This phased approach took place over a three-year 
implementation period, whereby large-cap firms with a public float greater than $5 billion (Phase 
1 firms), medium-cap firms with a public float between $700 million and $5 billion (Phase 2 firms), 
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and small-cap firms with a public float less than $700 million (Phase 3 firms) were required to 
adopt XBRL for financial reporting for periods ending on or after June 15, 2009, 2010, and 2011, 
respectively. In our study, we focus only on Phase 3, small-cap firms. Our sample covers the five-
year period from 2009 to 2013, and so includes two years before and two years after the mandatory 
XBRL adoption, in addition to the adoption year of 2011. Our choice of a relatively short sample 
period around 2011 allows us to isolate the effects of XBRL adoption with minimal likelihood of 
contamination by other confounding events. 
We exclude financial institutions (SIC codes 6000–6999) from our sample because they 
are subject to different tax and financial reporting incentives, rules, and regulations. We further 
exclude observations for which we do not have sufficient data to compute our tax avoidance 
measures and a set of control variables in our main regression model (Eq. (1)). We winsorize at 
the top and bottom 3% of all continuous variables used in our main regression model (as specified 
in Eq. (1)) to mitigate the influence of outliers. The above selection criteria yield a final sample of 
6,432 firm-year observations representing 1,705 unique Phase 3 firms. Panel A of Table 1 reports 
the distribution of observations across the Fama-French 48 industries (based on 4-digit SIC codes). 
Our sample spans a wide range of industries; the most represented is the Business Service industry 
(14.80%), followed by the Pharmaceutical Products industry (11.58%). Panel B reports the yearly 
distribution of our sample, which ranges from 1,210 observations in 2009 to 1,386 observations in 
2011. 
3.2. Measuring tax avoidance 
 To test our hypotheses we use three individual measures of tax avoidance and one 
composite measure combining the three. The first measure is total book-tax differences (BTD). 
BTD measures the total difference between pre-tax book income and estimated taxable income, 
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scaled by lagged total assets.9 The measure is widely used in the prior literature as an indicator of 
tax avoidance behavior. Prior research suggests that firms with larger BTD are more likely to 
receive an IRS audit, are subject to larger adjustments in consequence of tax audits, and are 
positively associated with the incidence of tax sheltering (Mills, 1998; Wilson, 2009).  
The second measure is the residual book-tax differences measure proposed by Desai and 
Dharmpala (2006) (DD_BTD). DD_BTD is the residual value from a regression of total book-tax 
differences scaled by lagged total assets (BTD) on total accruals scaled by lagged total assets after 
controlling for firm fixed effects. Using the residual value allows us to isolate the component of 
the book-tax differences that is unrelated to accruals. In other words, DD_BTD purges, at least 
partially, the book-tax differences caused by earnings management activities. 
The third measure is the effective tax rate differential (ETR_Differential). This measures 
the difference between total book-tax differences and temporary book-tax differences, scaled by 
lagged total assets, and thus is likely to capture permanent book-tax differences. Relying on 
permanent, rather than total, book-tax differences is perhaps more consistent with anecdotal 
evidence concerning the nature of tax-sheltering activity (Frank et al., 2009).  
Finally, to mitigate noise and potential bias associated with any individual proxy, we 
employ a factor analysis to extract the common factor from the above three individual measures 
(BTD_Factor). Prior studies have developed several proxies for tax avoidance but each proxy 
captures distinct but overlapping aspects of tax avoidance behavior (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
Chen et al. (2010) and Kim et al. (2011) suggest that the common factor extracted from a factor 
analysis provides a concise measure that captures a firm’s tax reporting behavior. Following Kim 
et al. (2011), we use factor analysis to extract BTD_Factor from BTD, ETR_Differential, and 
 
9 For ease of reference, we provide the detailed definitions of all variables in Appendix A. 
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DD_BTD. BTD_Factor is estimated using the varimax orthogonal rotation. Eigenvalues for the 
first and second principal components are 2.04 and 0.15, respectively. Thus, our choice of the first 
factor as BTD_Factor is supported by the Kaiser criterion, which is to exclude all components 
with eigenvalues less than 1. Rotated factor loadings on BTD, ETR_Differential, and DD_BTD are 
0.7825, 0.3932, and 0.8362, respectively. 
3.3. Model specification 
 Hypothesis H1 predicts that tax avoidance decreases after the mandatory adoption of 
XBRL for financial reporting. We test this hypothesis using the following regression model: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝐵𝑅𝐿_𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑞
𝑚
𝑞=2 (𝑞
𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑡,  (1) 
where Tax_Avoidance refers to one of our four measures of tax avoidance. The variable of interest 
is XBRL_Adoption, an indicator variable that equals one for firm-years after mandatory adoption 
of XBRL, and zero otherwise. Hypothesis H1 predicts that α1 should be negative. 
We include a set of control variables in Eq. (1) to isolate the XBRL reporting effect from 
other firm-level and macro-level factors contributing to tax avoidance behavior. To control for 
economies of scale and firm complexity, we include firm size (SIZE), R&D investment (RDEXP), 
financial leverage (LEV), book-to-market ratio (BTM), and non-current assets (PPE) in Eq. (1) 
(Mills et al., 1998; Rego, 2003; Chen et al., 2010; McGuire et al., 2012). Firms with negative pre-
tax income and/or significant net operating loss carryforwards have weaker incentives to engage 
in tax avoidance. Thus, we control for firm profitability (ROA), net operating loss carryforwards 
(NOL), and change in net operating loss carryforwards (∆NOL) in the regression model (Rego, 
2003; Frank et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010; McGuire et al., 2012; Chyz et al., 2013). We also 
control for the level of firms’ cash holdings (CASHSIZE) to account for firms’ cash needs that 
might necessitate certain types of tax avoidance (McGuire et al., 2012). Prior research suggests 
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that tax rates are endogenously determined in response to the macroeconomic environment 
(Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). To mitigate this concern, we include year dummies to capture time 
trends. Finally, the prior literature shows that firms’ tax strategies are affected by industry 
characteristics and trends (McGuire et al., 2012; Cen et al., 2017; Kubick et al., 2017). We thus 
include industry dummies to control for the effects of the industry on a firm’s tax avoidance 
strategy.10,11 
Hypothesis H2 examines whether the effect of XBRL adoption on tax avoidance is less 
pronounced if firms are subject to intense IRS monitoring before the XBRL mandate. To test this 
hypothesis, we augment equation (1) by adding PRE_IRSAUDIT and its interaction with 
XBRL_Adoption. Following Hoopes et al. (2012), we define PRE_IRSAUDIT as the number of 
face-to-face corporate audits over the total number of Form 1120s filed in a certain asset class one 
year before XBRL adoption. A higher value of PRE_IRSAUDIT indicates that the firm is subject 
to higher tax audit risk and thus more intense IRS monitoring before XBRL reporting. Hypothesis 
H2 predicts that the coefficient on the interaction term should be positive. 
       
4. Main results 
 
10 Smaller firms may also engage in tax avoidance in relation to state, as opposed to federal, filing requirements. In an 
untabulated robustness test, we control for differences in states’ filing requirements by including state fixed effects in 
the model. The results, which are available upon request, are consistent with our main findings. 
11 We include industry fixed effects rather than firm fixed effects because the within-firm variation in tax avoidance 
behavior is reasoned to be lower than across-firm variation. One limitation of firm fixed effects models is the 
possibility of fixed effects removing the theoretical cross-sectional variation of interest if firm characteristics change 
slowly over time (Zhou, 2001). We reason that slow-changing firm characteristics and/or overlapping measurement 
windows for our key variables contribute to lower within-firm variation in our key variables. Thus, a firm fixed effects 
model might be ill-suited to capture the theoretical cross-sectional variation of the effect that we study in this paper. 
Nevertheless, we perform a robustness test in which we control for firm fixed effects in place of industry fixed effects 
and rerun Eq. (1). Our results, which are available upon request, remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for all observations, after we separate them into the 
pre-XBRL (2009–2010) and post-XBRL periods (2011–2013). We find that, on average, tax 
avoidance decreases in the post-XBRL period for all measures of the behavior. The decline in 
ETR_Differential is marginally statistically significant but other tax avoidance measures are not 
statistically significant at the univariate level. We also note that the standard deviation is high for 
each tax avoidance measure, suggesting that our sample firms exhibit relatively large cross-firm 
variation in tax avoidance activities. 
The mean and median of SIZE, LEV, NOL, and ΔNOL increase in the post-XBRL period, 
indicating that firm size, leverage, and tax loss carryforwards all grow following the adoption of 
XBRL reporting. The mean and median of IRS_AUDITPROB are higher in the post-XBRL period. 
This implies that the reduced information asymmetry after mandatory XBRL adoption helps the 
budget-constrained IRS to expand the number of tax investigations undertaken and increases firms’ 
tax audit likelihood. However, the mean and median values of BTM, CASHSIZE, and ROA 
decrease following the adoption of XBRL reporting, suggesting that the increase in firm size may 
be driven by firms’ growth opportunities and leverage, rather than retained earnings. Recall that 
the most represented industry in our sample of small firms is the Business Service industry. 
4.2. Results for testing H1 
 Table 3 presents the results of estimating Eq. (1). Throughout the paper, reported t-values 
are calculated using robust standard errors that are clustered by firm and year (Petersen, 2009; 
Gow et al., 2010). As shown in Table 3, across all four measures of tax avoidance, we find strong 
and consistent evidence that the adoption of XBRL for financial reporting is associated with less 
tax avoidance activity. Specifically, when BTD is the dependent variable (column 1), the 
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coefficient on XBRL_Adoption is -0.0522 (t value = -1.99). After we remove the impact of earnings 
management on BTD, the effect of XBRL adoption on DD_BTD is still statistically significant in 
the predicted direction; the coefficient on XBRL_Adoption is -0.0302 (t value = -3.36) (column 2). 
Turning to permanent book-tax differences, we document a similar pattern, that tax avoidance 
decreases subsequent to the adoption of XBRL for financial reporting. As shown in column 3, 
where ETR_Differential is the dependent variable in Eq. (1), we find that the coefficient on 
XBRL_Adoption remains negative and highly significant (α1 = -0.0996; t-value = -4.65). Finally, 
we extract a common factor of BTD, DD_BTD, and ETR_Differential and estimate Eq. (1) using 
BTD_Factor as the dependent variable (column 4). We continue to find a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between XBRL reporting and tax avoidance (α1 = -0.0370; t value = -2.37). 
These results are consistent with hypothesis H1 and suggest that XBRL reporting reduces the IRS’s 
information processing costs and facilitates its tax monitoring activities. As a result, managers 
have less incentive to engage in tax avoidance behavior. 
The decrease in tax avoidance in the post-XBRL reporting period is economically 
significant. We estimate the economic significance by using the percentage change in tax 
avoidance relative to the average values of BTD, DD_BTD, and ETR_Differential for the pre-
XBRL adoption period. Our results imply decreases in BTD, DD_BTD, and ETR_Differential of 
17.03% (5.22 / 30.65), 17.03% (3.02 / 14.53), and 20.78% (9.96 / 55.89), respectively. However, 
we caution that the decrease in tax avoidance could also be attributable to concurrent 
macroeconomic shocks such as an improved economic environment after the financial crisis. We 
address this issue in subsection 4.3 using the DiD approach. 
 With respect to our control variables, the results are generally consistent with those 
reported in the prior literature. For instance, more profitable firms have higher levels of book-tax 
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differences. Cash-rich firms engage in less tax avoidance activities, presumably because their 
demand for additional cash savings via tax planning is relatively low. Although in theory we would 
expect a negative relationship between carryforward losses and incentives to engage in tax 
avoidance, we find mixed empirical evidence.12,13     
4.3. Results for testing H2 
Table 4 presents the results for testing hypothesis H2. The coefficient on XBRL_Adoption 
exhibits a negative sign regardless of the measure of tax avoidance used, but is not statistically 
significant for any of the measures. Consistent with our expectation, the coefficient on 
PRE_IRSAUDIT is negative and statistically significant when we measure tax avoidance using 
DD_BTD, ETR_Differential, and BTD_Factor, suggesting that in the pre-XBRL adoption period 
(i.e., XBRL_Adoption = 0), firms under more intense IRS monitoring and thus subject to higher 
tax audit risk engage in less tax avoidance activity. Of greater interest is the coefficient on the 
interaction term, XBRL_Adoption  PRE_IRSAUDIT, which captures cross-sectional variation in 
the relationship between XBRL reporting and tax avoidance with respect to firms’ tax audit risk 
in the pre-XBRL adoption period. We show that the coefficient is positive and statistically 
 
12 Bruhne and Jacob (2019) perform a meta-analysis of determinants of corporate tax avoidance based on 114 studies. 
They find that 45% of those studies document a statistically significant positive association between tax avoidance 
and NOL, whereas 20% report a statistically significant negative association between tax avoidance and NOL. Thus, 
Bruhne and Jacob (2019) classify losses (NOL) as a determinant of corporate tax avoidance with unambiguous 
prediction but mixed empirical evidence. Our mixed results for NOL across different measures of tax avoidance are 
in line with this view. 
13 To strengthen our identification strategy, we also perform a pseudo-event analysis. In this analysis, we re-estimate 
our baseline regression in Eq. (1) with firms randomly assigned to an XBRL adoption year over the sample period. 
To compute the reliable statistical significance of the estimated coefficient and ensure that the pseudo-event analysis 
results do not arise from ad hoc assignment of the XBRL adoption year, we construct a distribution of estimated 
coefficients. Specifically, we randomly assign the XBRL adoption year and based on the uniform distribution of these 
random assignments we calculate average t-statistics using 1,000 randomly chosen samples of firm-year observations 
to calculate the standard errors of each coefficient (Horowitz, 2001; Larcker et al., 2013). The standard error of the 
1,000 coefficient estimates is used to calculate average t-statistics. Untabulated results show that in none of our four 
models is the coefficient on XBRL_Adoption statistically significantly negative, as predicted by H1. The results of the 
pseudo analysis therefore reinforce the view that our main findings, reported in Table 3, are unlikely to be explained 
by other uncontrolled factors that can also affect tax avoidance behavior. 
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significant in all models except when we measure tax avoidance using ETR_Differential (coeff. = 
1.3375, t = 2.43 in the BTD model; coeff = 1.4123, t = 3.10 in the DD_BTD model; coeff = 0.2084, 
t = 0.45 in the ETR_Differential model; coeff = 1.8591, t = 3.35 in the BTD_Factor model). 
The above results indicate that the estimated marginal effect of XBRL reporting on tax 
avoidance comprises not only the coefficient on XBRL_Adoption but also a function of the 
coefficient on the interaction term and the value of PRE_IRSAUDIT. Thus, to measure the average 
marginal effect of XBRL reporting on tax avoidance, we add the coefficient on XBRL_Adoption 
and the coefficient on the interaction term multiplied by PRE_IRSAUDIT, where we set 
PRE_IRSAUDIT to its mean value (0.1449 in Table 2). Table 4 reports that the sums are -0.0753, 
-0.1350, -0.0720, and -0.0555 for the BTD, DD_BTD, ETR_Differential, and BTD_Factor models, 
respectively. All values are statistically significant except those for ETR_Differential as the 
dependent variable. Overall, our results suggest that the adoption of XBRL for financial reporting, 
on average, reduces tax avoidance incentives, and this effect is less prominent if the firm was under 
more intense IRS monitoring before the XBRL mandate, consistent with hypothesis H2. 
4.4. Difference-in-differences analysis for testing H1  
A potential concern about Eq. (1) is that XBRL_Adoption may be correlated with some 
other time-variant factors that contribute to the decline in tax avoidance over our sample period. 
In that case, we cannot rule out the possibility that the results in Table 3 are explained by correlated 
omitted variables. To address this issue, we extend our analyses using a DiD regression: 
    𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝐵𝑅𝐿_𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒3𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝐵𝑅𝐿_𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ×
𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒3𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑞
𝑚
𝑞=4 (𝑞
𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡,   (2) 
where XBRL_Adoption is an indicator variable that equals one for firm-years in the post-XBRL-
adoption period (starting on June 15, 2011), and zero otherwise; Phase3 is an indicator variable 
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that equals one for Phase 3 XBRL adopters and zero for non-XBRL adopters which do not report 
using XBRL in any of the three phases. The phase-in of mandatory adoption of XBRL offers a 
natural experiment setting in which both adopters (treatment group) and nonadopters (control 
group) exist over the same period of time. Specifically, we can compare the change in tax 
avoidance for Phase 3 adopters (treatment group) with that for nonadopters (control group) 
between 2009 and 2013. The DiD approach allows us to control for the impact on our results of 
market-wide, non-XBRL-related parallel factors that might have occurred during the Phase 3 
implementation period. In Eq. (2), we are primarily interested in the coefficient on XBRL_Adoption 
× Phase3 (β3), which measures the incremental difference in tax avoidance for Phase 3 firms 
compared to nonadopters from the pre- to the post-XBRL period after controlling for all other 
factors.  
To construct the control sample of non-adopter firms, we manually collect, from the SEC’s 
Edgar website, data for 155 firms which had never adopted XBRL for financial reporting prior to 
2014. Among these 155 firms, 88 are U.S. firms and 67 are international firms that are cross-listed 
in the U.S. Among the 88 U.S. firms, 66 firms are currently inactive and the total asset size of 
these inactive firms is generally larger than those of the active firms in the control sample. These 
control firms are listed in Appendix B. The active firms are exempt from XBRL reporting because 
they are very small firms, because they are foreign subsidiaries, or because they do not have any 
significant operations. Thus, we acknowledge the possibility that our control group could be 
different to our treatment group with respect to managerial incentives and tax strategies prior to 
the XBRL mandate. However, there is no compelling reason to believe that non-XBRL-related 
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parallel factors, if any, would affect Phase 3 firms and non-Phase 3 firms differently throughout 
our sample period.14   
 We report the results of estimating Eq. (2) in Table 5. We find that the coefficient on 
Phase3 is not statistically significantly different from zero except when we measure tax avoidance 
using BTD_Factor (β2 = 0.3255, t = 1.37 in the BTD model; β2 = 0.1940, t = 1.03 in the DD_BTD 
model; β2 = -0.1992, t = -1.60 in the ETR_Differential model; β2 = 0.1471, t = 1.77 in the 
BTD_Factor model). This suggests that Phase 3 adopters and control firms had similar tax 
avoidance strategies in the period prior to the SEC’s XBRL reporting mandate (i.e., when 
XBRL_Adoption = 0). Of primary interest to us is the coefficient on XBRL_Adoption × Phase3. 
We find that β3 is negative and statistically significant for all measures of tax avoidance (β3 = -
0.6012, t = -2.36 in the BTD model; β3 = -0.4065, t = -2.10 in the DD_BTD model; β3 = -0.4552, t 
= -2.29 in the ETR_Differential model; β3 = -0.2158, t = -2.35 in the BTD_Factor model). These 
results are consistent with hypothesis H1 and suggest that tax avoidance decreases from the pre- 
to the post-XBRL period for Phase 3 firms, relative to the corresponding change for non-adopting 
firms over the same period. The DiD results confirm that our baseline results reported in Section 
4.2 are unlikely to be driven by non-XBRL-related parallel factors that affect managerial 
opportunism in both treatment and control firms during our sample period.15 
 
5. Additional analyses 
 
14 We compare firm characteristics between Phase 3 (treatment) firms and control firms in the pre-XBRL period. The 
untabulated results (available on request) indicate that control firms are, on average, smaller, less profitable, less R&D 
intensive, and have lower book-to-market ratio than treatment firms.  
15 In untabulated analyses (available on request), we rerun the DiD regression for a matched sample based on firm size 
in the same industry-year. We match the treatment and control firms based on year and industry and then select the 
closest control firm in terms of total assets in the year before the XBRL adoption, allowing for matching with 
replacement. After matching, we find that in the pre-XBRL adoption period (2009–2010), the mean of firm size for 
treatment firms is 4.1517 whereas the mean of firm size for control firms is 4.2249, and the difference is not 
statistically significant (t value = 1.48). Our DiD regression results based on this matched sample are qualitatively the 
same as our main DiD results.  
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5.1. Dynamic analysis of the relationship between XBRL reporting and tax avoidance 
To further enhance our confidence in the results for H1 and to address concerns of potential 
reverse causality, we perform a dynamic analysis of the relationship between XBRL adoption and 
tax avoidance, following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Kim, Li, and Liu (2019). 
Specifically, we replace XBRL_Adoption in Eq. (1) with three indicator variables that denote the 
relative years surrounding the initial adoption of XBRL. One_Year_Before is an indicator variable 
that equals one for observations in the year prior to the initial adoption, and zero otherwise; 
Adoption_Year is an indicator variable that equals one for observations in the initial adoption year, 
and zero otherwise; One_Year_After is an indicator variable that equals one for observations one 
the year after the initial adoption, and zero otherwise. We expect the coefficient on 
One_Year_Before not to be statistically significant, or to be less significant than the coefficient on 
Adoption_Year or One_Year_After if XBRL reporting causes a decrease in tax avoidance. 
Table 6 presents the results of the dynamic analysis. The coefficient on One_Year_Before 
is positive and statistically significant in all models except when we measure tax avoidance using 
BTD, suggesting that tax avoidance is more pronounced in the year prior to the adoption of XBRL 
for financial reporting than later years. In contrast, the coefficients on Adoption_Year and 
One_Year_After are negative and statistically significant across all models with only one exception 
(the measure ETR_Differential for Adoption_Year). More importantly, the magnitude of the 
coefficient on One_Year_After is statistically significantly larger than that of the coefficient on 
One_Year_Before, suggesting that the decline in tax avoidance after the XBRL mandate is 
prevalent and statistically significant.16 Overall, the dynamic analysis, along with the DiD analysis, 
 
16  We do not include year dummies in the dynamic analysis because One_Year_Before, Adotpion_Year, and 
One_Year_After are individual year dummies. As an alternative approach to controlling for the macroenvironmental 
effect on corporate tax avoidance, we follow Hoopes et al. (2012) and run the dynamic analysis by imposing a linear 
trend on tax avoidance over time with a control variable, YEAR_C, that takes a value from 2009 to 2013. 
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enhances our confidence in the conclusion that the adoption of XBRL for financial reporting leads 
to a reduction in tax avoidance.  
5.2. The increase in the IRS’s use of financial information in tax monitoring 
 A key assumption in our study is that firms’ financial statements are an important source 
of information that the IRS uses to monitor tax avoidance behavior. If this assumption is valid, we 
expect to observe an increase in the IRS’s use of financial statement information in tax scrutiny 
subsequent to XBRL reporting. When information processing costs are lower, IRS examiners can 
perform more accurate analyses based on (tax-related) financial data in a more efficient way. Thus, 
XBRL reporting helps expand the scope and depth of IRS analysis of financial data and detect 
high-risk areas related to tax avoidance activities. This, in turn, leads to greater use by the IRS of 
XBRL-formatted financial statements. To confirm our prediction, we rerun equations (1) and (2) 
after replacing Tax_Avoidance with IRS 10-K DOWNLOADS as the dependent variable. 
 Following Bozanic et al. (2017), we infer the IRS’s use of financial statement information 
from IRS 10-K DOWNLOADS, the number of times in a year that a computer with an IRS IP 
address downloaded a 10-K from EDGAR for a given firm.17 To be consistent with Bozanic et al. 
(2017) in the regression analyses, we include additional control variables: MNE (whether a firm 
has foreign operations), SALESGROWTH (sales growth), and INTANGINT (intangible assets 
scaled by lagged total assets). Table 7 reports the results of examining the relationship between 
IRS 10-K DOWNLOADS and XBRL_Adoption. In the first column, we estimate the model without 
control firms. Consistent with our expectation, we find that the coefficient on XBRL_Adoption is 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the IRS relies more on financial statement data 
when performing tax examinations for firms after they adopt XBRL reporting. Turning to other 
 
17 We thank the authors of Bozanic et al. (2017) for sharing their IRS 10-K download data, which are available at 
http://www.jeffreyhoopes.com/data/irsattentiondata.html.. 
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firm characteristics, we show that larger and more profitable firms and firms with foreign 
operations are more likely to attract IRS attention. In the second column, we use our control firms 
as a benchmark against which we compare the impact of XBRL reporting on the IRS’s downloads 
of 10-K data. The coefficient on Phase3 is not statistically significant, suggesting that XBRL 
adopters and non-XBRL adopters have similar IRS 10-K downloads before 2011. We find that 
non-XBRL adopters experience a decline in IRS attention after 2011, because the coefficient on 
XBRL_Adoption is statistically significantly negative. Our main interest lies in the coefficient on 
the interaction between XBRL_Adoption and Phase 3, which indicates the difference in IRS 
downloads of 10-K data before and after 2011 for XBRL adopters relative to that for non-XBRL 
adopters. Consistent with our prediction, we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
on the interaction term. The main conclusion drawn from these results is that because XBRL 
reporting reduces information processing costs, the IRS increases its use of financial statement 
information in conducting tax scrutiny after 2011. 
5.3. Alternative tax avoidance measures 
 In this section, we assess the robustness of our results to four alternative tax avoidance 
measures. The first, ETR_Avg, is the firm’s average GAAP effective tax rate over the last three 
years. Effective tax rate is a frequently used summary measure of the firm’s tax planning strategies 
that investors and regulators can monitor and evaluate. The second alternative measure, TAETR, 
is the firm’s ETR_Avg adjusted by the three-year average GAAP effective tax rate of the firm’s 
size and industry peers (that is, those in the same quintile of total assets in the same industry). 
According to Armstrong et al. (2015), benchmarking the firm’s ETR_Avg against that of similar-
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sized firms in the same industry allows a more effective cross-sectional comparison and evaluation 
of whether the firm is excessively aggressive in tax planning.     
We also view unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) as another alternative tax avoidance 
measure. FIN 48 requires firms to analyze and disclose income tax risks and accounting reserves 
for future tax contingencies. It became effective in 2007 for all public firms that prepare financial 
statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP. Under FIN 48, firms record liabilities for uncertain tax 
positions that meet the threshold for unrecognized tax benefits.18 We calculate two UTB-based tax 
avoidance measures: UTB_ETR and UTB_TOTAL. UTB_ETR is the amount of total unrecognized 
tax benefits at the end of year t that will impact the effective tax rate, scaled by the total assets at 
the beginning of year t. UTB_TOTAL is the total unrecognized tax benefits at the end of year t 
scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t.  
Table 8 reports the results of regression of these four alternative measures on 
XBRL_Adoption, after controlling for other determinants of tax avoidance. We find significantly 
positive coefficients on XBRL_Adoption in the TAETR and ETR_Avg models and significantly 
negative coefficients on XBRL_Adoption in the UTB_TOTAL and UTB_ETR models, consistent 
with hypothesis H1.19   
5.4. Tax accrual quality analysis   
 As a robustness check, we test the effect of XBRL adoption on corporate tax accruals. Tax 
accrual quality represents variation in the degree to which income tax accruals match with 
subsequent cash flows from corporate income tax. Lower variation denotes higher quality of tax 
 
18 However, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggest that caution should be exercised when using this measure, because 
it could be driven by both tax and financial reporting incentives. Although higher UTB may indicate more uncertainty 
in a firm’s tax position, and thus reflect its level of tax avoidance, UTB is also constructed based on an accounting 
accrual, which is subject to managerial discretion. 
19 Because our control sample does not feature the data necessary to calculate these alternative measures of tax 
avoidance, we are not able to assess the robustness of the DiD results to these measures. 
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accruals (Choudhary et al., 2016). The quality of the income tax accruals is particularly relevant 
to examining the effect of XBRL on reducing information processing costs. The complexity of tax 
accruals highlights that information processing costs could be non-trivial to the IRS. This 
characteristic of tax accruals is evidenced by a recent increase in income tax-related financial 
reporting issues; for example, tax-related issues have now become one of the top-ten most 
recurrent restatement issues (Usvyatsky and Whalen, 2014). Moreover, the estimation procedure 
for tax accruals involves managerial judgment with respect to whether, where, and when 
transactions are taxable, because corporate managers have some discretion in applying tax 
regulations to the measurement of taxes with respect to individual items and events (SFAS 109; 
FASB, 1992). Accordingly, regulators are more focused on financial reporting of income taxes 
(Ernst and Young, 2014; Usvyatsky and Whalen, 2014). Taken all together, the above discussion 
emphasizes the relevance of examining the effect of XBRL adoption on the quality of tax accruals 
that are complex in nature. 
In this analysis, we re-estimate our baseline regression for Eq. (1) using tax accrual quality 
as the dependent variable. Following Choudhary et al. (2016), we measure TAXAQ as the negative 
standard deviation of the residuals from firm-specific estimates of total tax accruals on income 
taxes paid, change in the long-term portion of the deferred tax asset, and change in the long-term 
portion of the deferred tax liability. To ensure that our TAXAQ measure is clean, we calculate it 
for the pre-XBRL adoption period using data from 2006 to 2010 and for the post-XBRL adoption 
period using data from 2011 to 2015. The sample for this test contains 2,938 observations. Control 
variables in the TAXAQ model are the same as those used in Choudhary et al. (2016). We report 
the analysis of TAXAQ in Table 9, and we find that the coefficient on XBRL_Adoption is positive 
and statistically significant. This result is consistent with the notion that mandatory XBRL 
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adoption reduces costs and risks associated with processing complex tax-related information 
reflected in tax accrual quality. 
5.5. Extending the sample period to 2018 
 In our main tests, the sample period is from 2009 to 2013. We focus on a relatively short 
time window around 2011 in order to pinpoint the effect of adoption of XBRL. However, an 
interesting question is whether the XBRL effect on tax avoidance behavior can persist for a longer 
period. To examine this question, we extend our sample period to 2018 and rerun Eq. (1). We 
continue to find that the coefficient on XBRL_Adoption is negative and statistically significant 
(untabulated, available on request). More importantly, we find that the magnitude of the coefficient 
on XBRL_Adoption does not significantly differ from that in our short window test reported in 
Table 3. Thus, this finding suggests that the effect of XBRL adoption on corporate tax avoidance 
does not dissipate quickly over time.   
 
6. Conclusion 
In 2009, the SEC mandated that all registrants file their financial statements using XBRL 
over a three-year phase-in implementation period. This new search-facilitating technology is 
adopted to assist external users of financial statements in accessing, extracting, comparing, and 
screening financial information in a more accurate, timelier, and more efficient manner. It is 
reasonable to believe that the use of XBRL for financial reporting lowers both the costs of 
acquiring, processing, integrating, and analyzing financial statements, and information processing 
costs to outside information users, despite the fact that it does not change the content of the 
information reported in the financial statements. 
We examine whether the XBRL-induced reduction in information processing costs to the 
IRS mitigates corporate tax avoidance. The reduction in information processing costs should 
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facilitate IRS monitoring. With XBRL reporting, it is less costly for tax examiners to process tax-
related information reported in the financial statements and scrutinize excessive tax avoidance, 
which in turn deters such behaviors. We show that the extent of corporate tax avoidance decreases 
significantly after the adoption of XBRL for financial reporting. We also find that this pattern is 
less pronounced for firms that were subject to more intense IRS monitoring before the XBRL 
mandate.  
Although a large body of research has examined the capital market consequences of XBRL 
reporting, researchers have paid little attention to the implications for managerial (real) actions 
such as tax avoidance. Our study attempts to fill this gap in the research. Furthermore, it remains 
highly controversial, from a policy perspective, whether small firms should be exempt from XBRL 
reporting. Although we do not intend to resolve this policy debate by directly testing the cost-
benefit trade-off associated with XBRL reporting, our results suggest that another benefit from 
XBRL reporting is to facilitate IRS monitoring of corporate tax avoidance. 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
 
BTD = Total book-tax differences, equal to pre-tax income (pi) less estimated taxable 
income scaled by lagged total assets (at). Taxable income is the sum of the 
current federal tax expense (txfed) and current foreign tax expense (txfo) 
divided by the statutory tax rate less the change in net operating loss 
carryforward (tlcf). If the current federal tax expense is not reported, the total 
current tax expense is calculated as total income taxes (txt) less deferred 
taxes (txdi), state income taxes (txs), and other income taxes (txo) (Kim et 
al., 2011; McGuire et al., 2012). We remove observations with total assets of 
less than $1 million and observations with negative taxable income 
(txfed<0). 
DD_BTD = The Desai–Dharmapala (2006) residual book-tax differences. Calculated as the 
residual estimated from the following firm fixed effects regression: BTDi,t = 
β1TACCi,t + μi + εi,t, where BTD is total book-tax differences and TACC is 
total accruals derived from the statement of cash flows and scaled by lagged 
total assets.  
ETR_Differential = The effective tax rate (ETR) differential based on Frank et al. (2009) and Kim 
et al. (2011). It is calculated as (PI - ((TXFED + TXFO)/STR)) - 
(TXDI/STR), scaled by lagged assets (at). PI is pre-tax book income (pi); 
TXFED is the current federal tax expense (txfed); TXFO is the current 
foreign tax expense (txfo); TXDI is the deferred tax expense (txdi); STR is 
the statutory tax rate. 
BTD_Factor = A common factor extracted from three different book-tax difference measures: 
BTD, DD_BTD, and ETR_Differential. 
XBRL_Adoption = An indicator variable that equals one for firm-years in the post-XBRL-adoption 
period, and zero otherwise. 
SIZE = The natural logarithm of total assets (at) at the beginning of year t. 
RDEXP = R&D expense divided by lagged total assets. 
LEV = Total long-term debt divided by lagged total assets. 
BTM = The natural logarithm of the book value of common equity (ceq) divided by the 
market value of common equity (csho × prcc_f). 
CASHSIZE = Cash and short-term investments (che) divided by lagged total assets. 
NOL = An indicator variable that equals one if the firm reports a tax-loss carryforward, 
and zero otherwise. 
ΔNOL = The change in tax-loss carryforwards from year t-1 to year t scaled by lagged 
total assets. 
ROA = Income before extraordinary items (pi - xi) divided by the average total assets. 
PPE = Property, plant, and equipment (ppegt) divided by lagged total assets. 
IRSAUDITPROB = The number of face-to-face corporate audits completed in IRS fiscal year t in 
asset class a, divided by total number of 1120s filed in calendar year t-1 in 
asset class a.  
PRE_IRSAUDIT = IRSAUDITPROB in the pre-XBRL-adoption period, multiplied by minus one. 
Phase3 = An indicator variable that equals one for small-cap firms with a public float less 
than $700 million that are required to adopt XBRL for financial reporting on or 
after June 15, 2011, and zero otherwise. 
MNE  An indicator variable that equals one for multinational firms (i.e., firms that 
report any foreign pre-tax income (PIFO)), and zero otherwise. 
SALESGROWTH  The difference between current-year sales (SALE) and prior-year sales, divided 
by prior-year sales. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2754427
35 
 
INTANGINT  Intangible assets (INTAN) divided by lagged total assets; missing values set to 
equal zero. 
TAXAQ = Standard deviation of the residuals from firm-specific estimates of (TaxACCjt = 
b0 + b1CTPjt-1 + b2CTPjt + b3CTPjt+1 + b4DDTL_LTjt + b5DDTA_LTjt + ejt), 
multiplied by -1. TaxACC is the total tax accrual. CTP is cash taxes paid for 
income taxes, scaled by total assets. DDTA_LT is the change in the long-term 
portion of the deferred tax asset scaled by total assets. DDTL_LT is the change 
in the long-term portion of the deferred tax liability scaled by total assets. 
UTB_EST = Predicted value of unrecognized tax benefits, estimated from Equation 1 in 
Rego and Wilson (2012). 
ESO_INDUSTRY = Indicator variable equal to one if a firm operates in an industry with potentially 
large tax deductions from the exercise of options (defined as industry SIC 
codes 30-39 and 70-89), and zero otherwise. 
DISC_EXTRA = Indicator variable equal to one when a firm reports a large 
discretionary/extraordinary item (defined as discontinued and extraordinary 
items from the Statement of Cash Flows (XIDOCjt) > one percent of revenue 
(REVTjt)), and zero otherwise. 
PTBI_VOL = Standard deviation of pre-tax income (PTBIjt) scaled by total assets (ATjt), 
measured from years t-7 through t. 
TAX_LOSS = Indicator variable equal to one when the current tax expense (UTXFEDjt) is 
less than zero, and zero otherwise. 
FOREIGN = Indicator variable equal to one when a firm reports a non-zero foreign tax 
expense (TXFOjt), and zero otherwise. 
LNAT = The natural logarithm of total assets (ATjt). 
AQ 
 
= Standard deviation of the residuals from firm-specific estimates of ∆WCjt = α + 
β1CFOjt-1 + β2CFOjt + β3CFOjt+1 + β4∆REVjt + β5PPEjt + εjt, multiplied by -1 
so larger values indicate better working capital accruals quality. 
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Appendix B: Control sample for the difference-in-differences test 
 
Company Name Country Company Name Country 
ACIES CORP USA INVICTUS FINANCIAL INC CAN 
ACQUITY GROUP LTD  -ADR HKG IVANHOE ENERGY INC CAN 
ADC TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC USA JACLYN INC USA 
ADECOAGRO SA LUX KINROSS GOLD CORP CAN 
AETERNA ZENTARIS INC USA KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS NV NLD 
AFRICA OIL CORP CAN LADISH CO INC USA 
ALDILA INC USA LE GAGA HOLDINGS LTD  -ADR HKG 
ALLIANCE PHARMACEUTICAL USA LUXFER HOLDINGS PLC GBR 
ALLIANCE SEMICONDUCTOR CORP USA MACKAY LIFE SCIENCES INC USA 
ALPHATRADE.COM CAN MAG SILVER CORP CAN 
ALPINE GROUP INC USA MARINE HARVEST ASA NOR 
AMBASSADORS INTERNATIONL INC USA MATRIXX INITIATIVES INC USA 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY DEV INC USA MED BIOGENE INC CAN 
AMERICAN SECURITY RES CORP USA MEDLINK INTERNATIONAL INC USA 
AMERICAN WENSHEN STEEL GROUP USA MEGOLA INC CAN 
AVINCI MEDIA CORP USA METAL STORM LTD AUS 
BALLARD POWER SYSTEMS INC CAN MICROMEM TECHNOLOGIES INC CAN 
BANRO CORP CAN MIDDLEBROOK PHARMACEUTICALS USA 
BIOLINE RX LTD ISR NATURAL RESOURCES USA CORP USA 
BITAUTO HOLDINGS LTD  -ADR CHN NGAS RESOURCES INC USA 
BORDERS GROUP INC USA NIVS INTELLIMEDIA TECHNOLOGY CHN 
BRITISH AMER TOBACCO PLC GBR NMT MEDICAL INC USA 
BRONCO DRILLING CO USA NOBEL LEARNING CMNTYS INC USA 
CALIFORNIA PIZZA KITCHEN INC USA NOVADAQ TECHNOLOGIES INC CAN 
CANARC RESOURCE CORP CAN NOVAMED INC USA 
CARDIMA INC USA NU HORIZONS ELECTRONICS CORP USA 
CARGO CONNECTION LOGISTICS USA NYMOX PHARMACEUTICAL CORP BHS 
CAVICO CORP USA OCCAM NETWORKS INC USA 
CELLU TISSUE HOLDINGS INC USA OCEANFREIGHT INC GRC 
CHINA ENTERPRISES LTD HKG OCTUS INC USA 
CHINA MEDIAEXPRESS HLDGS INC HKG ODYSSEY HEALTHCARE INC USA 
CHINA REAL ESTATE INFO  -ADR CHN OMEGA NAVIGATION ENT INC GRC 
CHINA RITAR POWER CORP CHN ORSUS XELENT TECHNOLOGIES CHN 
CHINA SHUANGJI CEMENT LTD CHN PACIFIC RIM MINING CORP CAN 
CHINA WIND ENERGY INC CHN PC GROUP INC USA 
CHINA ZENIX AUTO INTL  -ADR CHN PETAQUILLA MINERALS LTD CAN 
CHINAWE.COM INC HKG PHOSPHATE HOLDINGS INC USA 
COMMERCE GROUP CORP USA PINAFORE HOLDINGS BV USA 
CRH PLC IRL PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES  -CL B USA 
CRUDE CARRIERS CORP GRC POLYMET MINING CORP CAN 
CYPRESS BIOSCIENCE INC USA PRANA BIOTECHNOLOGY LTD AUS 
DATASCENSION INC USA PRIME STAR GROUP INC USA 
DHT HOLDINGS INC BMU PROGEN PHARMACEUTICALS LTD AUS 
DIALYSIS CORP OF AMERICA USA QEP CO INC USA 
DIGERATI TECHNOLOGIES INC USA QUARTZ MOUNTAIN RESOURCES CAN 
DOVER SADDLERY INC USA REDHILL BIOPHARMA LTD ISR 
DRUGSTORE.COM INC USA REVO BIOLOGICS INC  -REDH USA 
DYADIC INTERNATIONAL INC USA RIVAL TECHNOLOGIES INC USA 
ELLOMAY CAPITAL LTD ISR ROCK OF AGES CORP  -CL A USA 
ENCORIUM GROUP INC USA ROYAL STANDARD MINERALS INC CAN 
ENDWAVE CORP USA RUSORO MINING LTD CAN 
ENERGY FUELS INC USA SAND TECHNOLOGY INC  -CL A CAN 
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ENI SPA ITA SANDSTORM GOLD LTD CAN 
EVERGREEN SOLAR INC USA SCORPIO TANKERS INC MCO 
EVOTEC AG DEU SEAHAWK DRILLING INC USA 
EXCEED CO LTD HKG SENSIVIDA MEDICAL TECH INC USA 
FIRE RIVER GOLD CORP USA SINO SHIPPING HOLDINGS INC CHN 
GALLERY OF HISTORY INC USA SKY-MOBI LTD  -ADR CHN 
GASLOG LTD MCO SPECTRUM CONTROL INC USA 
GDT TEK INC USA SPIRENT COMMUNICATIONS GBR 
GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES LTD AUS TAG OIL LTD CAN 
GEOS COMMUNICATIONS INC USA TBC GLOBAL NEWS NETWORK-OLD USA 
GERBER SCIENTIFIC INC USA TIGRENT INC USA 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC GBR TITAN TECHNOLOGIES INC USA 
GLOBAL SOURCES LTD BMU TOLLGRADE COMMUNICATIONS INC USA 
GLOBUS MARITIME LTD GRC TRANSGLOBE ENERGY CORP CAN 
GOLDEN ELEPHANT GLASS TECH CHN TRANSNET CORP USA 
GRUMA SAB DE CV MEX TRINITY BIOTECH PLC IRL 
HEARUSA INC USA URIGEN PHARMACEUTICALS -REDH USA 
HENRY BROS ELECTRONICS INC USA VITAL IMAGES INC USA 
HUGHES COMMUNICATIONS INC USA VOLCOM INC USA 
HYDROGENICS CORP CAN WIPRO LTD IND 
HYDRON TECHNOLOGIES INC USA WIRELESS XCESSORIES GRP INC USA 
HYPERCOM CORP USA WOLSELEY PLC CHE 
IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP PLC GBR XETA TECHNOLOGIES INC USA 
INCA DESIGNS INC USA XTL BIOPHARMACEUTICALS ISR 
INFOSMART GROUP INC USA ZUOAN FASHION LTD  -ADR CHN 
INTEGRAL SYSTEMS INC USA   
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Table 1: Sample distribution  
Panel A: Sample distribution by industry  
Fama-French industry classification (industry number) Frequency Percent 
Agriculture (1) 27 0.42 
Aircraft (24) 32 0.50 
Alcoholic Beverages (4) 10 0.16 
Apparel (10) 54 0.84 
Automobiles and Trucks (23) 147 2.29 
Business Services (34) 952 14.80 
Business Supplies (38) 54 0.84 
Beverage (3) 11 0.17 
Chemicals (14) 125 1.94 
Coal (29) 13 0.20 
Computers (35) 188 2.92 
Construction Materials (17) 184 2.86 
Construction (18) 71 1.10 
Consumer Goods (9) 90 1.40 
Defense (26) 17 0.26 
Electrical Equipment (22) 160 2.49 
Electronic Equipment (36) 445 6.92 
Entertainment (7) 110 1.71 
Fabricated Products (20) 16 0.25 
Food Products (2) 123 1.91 
Healthcare (11) 170 2.64 
Machinery (21) 193 3.00 
Measuring and Control Equipment (37) 160 2.49 
Medical Equipment (12) 350 5.44 
Miscellaneous (48) 113 1.76 
Non-metallic Mining (28) 86 1.34 
Personal Services (33) 81 1.26 
Petroleum and Natural Gas (30) 301 4.68 
Pharmaceutical Products (13) 745 11.58 
Precious Metals (27) 75 1.17 
Publishing (8) 36 0.56 
Recreational Products (6) 52 0.81 
Restaurants and Hotels (43) 100 1.55 
Retail (42) 285 4.43 
Rubber and Plastic Products (15) 44 0.68 
Ship Building, Railroad Equipment (25) 18 0.28 
Shipping Containers (39) 5 0.08 
Steel Works, Etc. (19) 57 0.89 
Telecommunications (32) 208 3.23 
Textiles (16) 21 0.33 
Transportation (40) 216 3.36 
Utilities (31) 39 0.61 
Wholesale (41) 248 3.85 
Total 6,432 100.00 
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Panel B: Sample distribution by year 
Fiscal Year Frequency Percent 
2009 1,210 18.81 
2010 1,312 20.40 
2011 1,386 21.55 
2012 1,307 20.32 
2013 1,217 18.92 
Total 6,432 100.00 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
 
Variables 
Pre-XBRL-adoption subsample (n = 2,692) Post-XBRL-adoption subsample (n = 3,740) Difference in 
means Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
XBRL_Adoption 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000  
BTD -0.3064 0.0060 1.4340 -0.3310 0.0060 1.5012 -0.0246 
DD_BTD 0.1453 0.0017 2.0594 0.1239 0.0027 2.0540 -0.0214 
ETR_Differential -0.5589 -0.0093 1.7145 -0.6282 -0.0122 1.8558 -0.0693* 
BTD_Factor 0.4677 0.3398 2.2989 0.4419 0.3400 2.3457 -0.0258 
SIZE 4.2809 4.6311 1.7973 4.3835 4.6743 1.9966 0.1026** 
RDEXP 0.1081 0.0007 0.2364 0.1039 0.0019 0.2221 -0.0042 
LEV 0.1667 0.0102 0.3202 0.1849 0.0195 0.3339 0.0181** 
BTM 0.3690 0.4710 1.6604 0.2901 0.4405 1.8288 -0.0789* 
CASHSIZE 0.3672 0.1690 0.6336 0.3127 0.1550 0.5207 -0.0545*** 
NOL 0.7805 1.0000 0.4140 0.8406 1.0000 0.3661 0.0602*** 
ΔNOL 0.3604 0.0000 1.8208 0.4410 0.0046 1.9577 0.0806* 
ROA -0.6482 -0.0180 2.2977 -0.8053 -0.0080 2.6217 -0.1571** 
PPE 0.2566 0.1406 0.3114 0.2467 0.1295 0.3046 -0.0098 
IRS_AUDITPROB 0.1449 0.1327 0.0770 0.1838 0.2038 0.0917 0.0389*** 
DIST_IRS -0.0024 -0.0894 0.9929 0.0017 -0.0749 1.0051 0.0041 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the pre-XBRL-adoption and post-XBRL-adoption subsamples. The pre-XBRL-adoption period is from 2009 to 2010. 
The post-XBRL-adoption period is from 2011 to 2013. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for 
variable definitions.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2754427
41 
 
Table 3: The relationship between XBRL adoption and corporate tax avoidance 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables BTD DD_BTD ETR_Differential BTD_Factor 
XBRL_Adoption -0.0522 -0.0302 -0.0996 -0.0370 
 (-1.99)** (-3.36)*** (-4.65)*** (-2.37)** 
SIZE 0.0639 -0.0208 0.0506 -0.0152 
 (6.86)*** (-3.27)*** (6.81)*** (-3.80)*** 
RDEXP -0.4109 -0.1532 -0.5618 -0.4004 
 (-2.42)** (-6.01)*** (-4.06)*** (-3.34)*** 
LEV -0.1511 0.0573 -0.1864 0.0522 
 (-1.84)* (1.29) (-2.03)** (0.81) 
BTM 0.0284 -0.0278 0.0325 -0.0168 
 (2.02)** (-5.79)*** (2.54)** (-3.29)*** 
CASHSIZE -0.7933 -0.6433 -0.7886 -0.6468 
 (-11.87)*** (-30.59)*** (-11.59)*** (-10.50)*** 
NOL 0.0348 -0.0989 0.0507 -0.0422 
 (1.02) (-2.36)** (1.37) (-1.47) 
ΔNOL 0.3620 0.5046 -0.2093 0.5740 
 (15.61)*** (57.68)*** (-9.32)*** (40.34)*** 
ROA 0.4155 0.0960 0.4627 0.1103 
 (25.76)*** (23.12)*** (26.47)*** (26.24)*** 
PPE -0.7413 -0.7522 -0.6688 -0.6853 
 (-6.74)*** (-19.74)*** (-6.14)*** (-4.08)*** 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 6,432 6,432 6,432 6,432 
Adj. R-Square 0.547 0.188 0.769 0.187 
 
Table 3 presents the OLS regression results for the relationship between XBRL adoption and corporate tax 
avoidance. We report t-statistics in parentheses with standard errors clustered by firm and year. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 4: The relationship between XBRL reporting and corporate tax avoidance, 
conditional on IRS monitoring before the XBRL adoption 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables BTD DD_BTD ETR_Differential BTD_Factor 
XBRL_Adoption (α1) -0.2691 -0.3396 -0.1022 -0.3249 
 (-0.14) (-1.17) (-0.89) (-1.36) 
PRE_IRSAUDIT (α2) -0.634 -2.2319 -1.9024 -2.5032 
 (0.75) (-4.34)*** (-4.16)*** (-3.19)*** 
XBRL_Adoption  1.3375 1.4123 0.2084 1.8591 
×PRE_IRSAUDIT (α3) (2.43)** (3.10)*** (0.45) (3.35)*** 
SIZE 0.0362 0.0438 -0.0040 0.0210 
 (0.99) (0.87) (-0.48) (1.13) 
RDEXP -0.0413 -1.3182 -0.5231 -0.3854 
 (-0.13) (-1.62) (-3.03)*** (-0.75) 
LEV -0.2357 0.3108 -0.2674 0.0707 
 (-1.38) (0.60) (-2.65)*** (0.40) 
BTM 0.0772 -0.0647 0.0312 -0.0168 
 (2.63)*** (-1.35) (1.97)** (-1.07) 
CASHSIZE -1.8127 -1.3997 -0.7179 -0.6483 
 (-13.89)*** (-5.94)*** (-9.47)*** (-6.29)*** 
NOL 0.0937 -0.4662 0.0705 -0.1350 
 (1.68)* (-0.98) (1.77)* (-0.74) 
ΔNOL 0.8394 1.1480 -0.1927 0.5915 
 (19.11)*** (10.10)*** (-8.33)*** (12.07)*** 
ROA 0.9582 0.1255 0.4596 0.1141 
 (20.17)*** (1.09) (25.78)*** (3.76)*** 
PPE -1.4772 -1.4371 -0.4697 -0.6548 
 (-11.66)*** (-2.48)** (-4.66)*** (-4.80)*** 
     
Test of average marginal effect of XBRL adoption on tax avoidance  
(H0: α1 + α3 × mean value of PRE_IRSAUDIT = 0)  
Value -0.0753 -0.1350 -0.0720 -0.0555 
F stat. (3.04)** (11.36)*** (0.59) (10.84)*** 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 5,713 5,713 5,713 5,713 
Adj. R-Square 0.530 0.187 0.767 0.203 
 
Table 4 reports the OLS regression results of estimating the relationship between XBRL adoption and corporate tax 
avoidance, conditional on IRS monitoring intensity (i.e., tax audit risk) before the XBRL mandate. We report t-
statistics in parentheses with standard errors clustered by firm and year. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions.
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Table 5: Difference-in-differences regression analyses of the relationship between 
XBRL adoption and corporate tax avoidance 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables BTD DD_BTD ETR_Differential BTD_Factor 
XBRL_Adoption 0.4468 0.2142 0.2620 0.1320 
 (1.82)* (1.13) (1.31) (1.80)* 
Phase3 0.3255 0.1940 -0.1992 0.1471 
 (1.37) (1.03) (-1.60) (1.77)* 
XBRL_Adoption -0.6012 -0.4065 -0.4552 -0.2158 
  × Phase3 (-2.36)** (-2.10)** (-2.29)** (-2.35)** 
SIZE 0.1429 0.0431 0.1134 0.0296 
 (5.08)*** (1.65)* (3.33)*** (2.87)*** 
RDEXP 0.2449 0.6343 2.4794 -0.0041 
 (0.37) (0.69) (3.56)*** (-0.01) 
LEV -0.9297 -0.4976 0.0425 -0.3475 
 (-3.00)*** (-0.72) (0.15) (-1.26) 
BTM 0.0640 -0.0164 0.0530 -0.0013 
 (1.22) (-0.32) (1.76)* (-0.06) 
CASHSIZE -2.1065 -1.8448 -3.2534 -0.6984 
 (-2.47)** (-2.97)*** (-1.77)* (-2.64)*** 
NOL 0.0426 0.0010 -0.1045 0.0203 
 (0.59) (0.01) (-0.60) (0.34) 
ΔNOL 0.2918 0.3239 -0.3264 0.2010 
 (5.69)*** (2.78)*** (-4.57)** (3.66)*** 
ROA 0.0469 0.0071 0.0553 0.0080 
 (4.94)*** (1.06) (3.14)*** (2.67)*** 
PPE -1.6338 -1.7883 -3.6255 -0.4979 
 (-1.59) (-1.80)* (-1.45) (-1.16) 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 6,776 6,776 6,776 6,776 
Adj. R-Square 0.541 0.717 0.760 0.599 
 
Table 5 reports difference-in-differences regression results of estimating the relationship between XBRL adoption 
and tax avoidance. For the control sample, we manually identify and extract 155 firms from the SEC’s EDGAR 
website that did not adopt XBRL prior to 2014. We report t-statistics in parentheses with standard errors clustered 
by firm and year. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A 
for variable definitions. 
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Table 6: The relationship between XBRL adoption and corporate tax avoidance – 
dynamic analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables BTD DD_BTD ETR_Differential BTD_Factor 
One_Year_Before 0.0034 0.0335 0.0377 0.0764 
 (0.50) (3.28)*** (8.02)*** (6.29)*** 
Adoption_Year -0.0354 -0.0922 0.0102 -0.0806 
 (-2.51)*** (-3.43)*** (0.96) (-2.94)*** 
One_Year_After -0.1208 -0.1908 -0.0710 -0.1211 
 (-6.55)*** (-5.94)*** (-4.95)*** (-3.86)*** 
SIZE 0.0622 -0.0222 0.0490 -0.0148 
 (10.05)*** (-1.39) (5.89)*** (-0.96) 
RDEXP -0.4283 -0.1653 -0.5743 -0.4073 
 (-3.46)*** (-0.41) (-4.85)*** (-1.36) 
LEV -0.0181 0.1682 -0.0955 0.1819 
 (-0.24) (1.37) (-0.81) (1.18) 
BTM 0.0324 -0.0250 0.0355 -0.0152 
 (2.56)** (-0.61) (2.61)*** (-0.26) 
CASHSIZE -0.7882 -0.6316 -0.7879 -0.6320 
 (-13.49)*** (-6.23)*** (-12.38)*** (-7.81)*** 
NOL 0.0253 -0.1051 0.0428 -0.0453 
 (1.17) (-1.79) (1.53) (-0.74) 
ΔNOL 0.3616 0.5052 -0.2101 0.5771 
 (17.69)*** (14.63)*** (-9.01)*** (18.55)*** 
ROA 0.4167 0.0970 0.4635 0.1145 
 (25.88)*** (2.10)** (4.53)*** (2.94)*** 
PPE -0.7915 -0.7640 -0.7172 -0.7141 
 (-6.70)*** (-5.02)*** (-6.91)*** (-3.82)*** 
YEAR_C 0.0206 0.0287 0.0181 0.0172 
(4.12)*** (4.22)*** (4.88)*** (1.84)* 
     
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 6,432 6,432 6,432 6,432 
Adj. R-Square 0.546 0.188 0.768 0.188 
 
Table 6 reports the results of estimating dynamic effects of XBRL adoption on corporate tax avoidance. In Eq. (1), 
we replace the XBRL_Adoption variable with three indicator variables: One_Year_Before, Adoption_Year, and 
One_Year_After, to denote the relative years around initial XBRL adoption. One_Year_Before is a dummy variable 
that equals one for observations in the one-year period prior to the initial adoption year, and zero otherwise; 
Adoption_Year is a dummy variable that equals one for observations in the year XBRL is first adopted, and zero 
otherwise; One_Year_After is a dummy variable that equals one for observations one year after the initial adoption 
year, and zero otherwise. We report t-statistics in parentheses with standard errors clustered by firm and year. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for other variable 
definitions.
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Table 7: Increase in the IRS’s use of financial statements subsequent to the adoption of 
XBRL reporting 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variables IRS 10-K DOWNLOADS IRS 10-K DOWNLOADS 
XBRL_Adoption 0.0443 -0.5477 
 (3.21)*** (-2.87)*** 
Phase3  -0.0403 
  (-0.44) 
XBRL_Adoption  0.5861 
  × Phase3  (3.16)*** 
SIZE 0.0987 0.0935 
 (7.41)*** (13.89)*** 
RDEXP -0.1830 -0.1696 
 (-2.34)** (-3.59)*** 
LEV 0.0469 0.0237 
 (1.31) (0.70) 
BTM -0.0052 -0.0044 
 (-0.90) (-0.76) 
CASHSIZE -0.0877 -0.0794 
 (-3.10)*** (-5.13)*** 
NOL -0.0464 -0.0195 
 (-3.15) (-0.61) 
ΔNOL 0.0024 0.0017 
 (0.66) (0.37) 
ROA 0.0070 0.0075 
 (2.59)*** (1.92)* 
PPE -0.0610 -0.0472 
 (-2.64)*** (-1.07) 
MNE 0.0967 0.1007 
 (4.20)*** (3.43)*** 
SALESGROWTH -0.0235 -0.0267 
 (-1.57) (-3.08)*** 
INTANGINT -0.0503 -0.0735 
 (-0.63) (-1.30) 
   
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Num. of obs. 6,029 6,175 
Adj. R-Square 0.108 0.165 
 
Table 7 reports the results of estimating the effect of XBRL adoption on the IRS’s use of financial statement 
information. IRS 10-K DOWNLOADS is the number of times during year t that a computer with an IRS IP address 
downloaded a 10-K from EDGAR for a given firm. We report t-statistics in parentheses with standard errors 
clustered by firm and year. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See 
Appendix A for other variable definitions. 
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Table 8: The relationship between XBRL adoption and corporate tax avoidance – 
alternative tax avoidance measures 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables ETR_Avg TAETR UTB_ETR UTB_Total 
XBRL_Adoption 0.0166 0.0135 -0.0019 -0.0036 
 (1.70)* (2.89)*** (-4.25)*** (-2.77)*** 
SIZE 0.0228 0.0012 0.0009 0.0005 
 (6.79)*** (0.56) (3.30)*** (1.05) 
RDEXP -0.0996 -0.0418 0.0027 0.0378 
 (-2.51)** (-1.18) (2.19)** (4.21)*** 
LEV -0.0963 -0.1035 -0.0020 0.0006 
 (-2.98)*** (-3.78)*** (-1.91)* (0.23) 
BTM 0.0079 -0.0078 0.0000 -0.0016 
 (1.10) (-1.93)* (0.29) (-3.00)*** 
CASHSIZE -0.0453 -0.0334 0.0009 0.0006 
 (-3.04)*** (-2.26)** (1.22) (0.21) 
NOL -0.1560 -0.1501 0.0021 0.0053 
 (-12.54)*** (-18.32)*** (12.48)*** (7.95)*** 
ΔNOL 0.0034 0.0033 -0.0004 0.0001 
 (0.55) (0.62) (-1.43) (0.05) 
ROA 0.0352 0.0281 0.0002 0.0012 
 (2.89)*** (3.48)*** (1.46) (1.54) 
PPE -0.0258 -0.0263 -0.0025 -0.0091 
 (-1.12) (-0.88) (-5.23)*** (-5.39)*** 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num. of obs. 3,139 3,139 3,139 3,139 
Adj. R-Square 0.1068 0.0598 0.0680 0.0981 
 
Table 8 reports the results of estimating the relationship between XBRL adoption and corporate tax avoidance using 
four alternative measures: ETR_Avg is the average three-year GAAP effective tax rate; TAETR is computed as 
ETR_Avg adjusted by the mean three-year GAAP ETR of the firm’s size and industry peers; UTB_ETR is the 
amount of total unrecognized tax benefits at the end of year that will impact the effective tax rate, scaled by lagged 
total assets; UTB_Total is total unrecognized tax benefits at the end of year scaled by lagged total assets. We report 
t-statistics in parentheses with standard errors clustered by firm and year. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. 
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Table 9: Regression analyses of XBRL adoption and Tax Accrual Quality 
 



















   
Year dummies Yes  
Industry dummies Yes  
Number of obs. 2,938 
Adj. R-Square 0.137  
 
Table 9 presents the OLS regression results of estimating the relationship between XBRL adoption and tax accrual 
quality (TAXAQ). TAXAQ is the standard deviation of the residuals from firm-specific estimates of the following 
model: TAXACCjt = b0 + b1CTPjt-1 + b2CTPjt + b3CTPjt+1 + b4DDTL_LTjt + b5DDTA_LTjt + ejt. We multiply TAXAQ 
by -1, so larger values indicate better tax accrual quality. This regression model is fitted in pre- and post-XBRL 
periods, separately, to compute TAXAQ. CTP is cash taxes paid scaled by total assets. TAXACC is the total tax 
accrual, calculated as the total tax expense scaled by total assets less cash taxes paid scaled by total assets. 
DDTL_LT is change in the long-term portion of the deferred tax liability scaled by total assets. DDTA_LT is change 
in the long-term portion of the deferred tax asset scaled by total assets. We report t-statistics in parentheses with 
standard errors clustered by firm and year. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
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